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Professional service providers such as accountants and
attorneys are not immune from liability under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").1 Courts
have interpreted and applied RICO's broad prohibitions liberally,
leaving professionals susceptible to criminal prosecutions and
civil actions for treble damages.2 Section 1962(c) of RICO poses
the greatest threat to professionals, making it unlawful for "any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activi-
ty.... ." This language presents an obvious question: What
degree of "conduct" or "participation" will support a verdict
against a professional? In Reves v Ernst & Young, a suit against
auditors, the Supreme Court provided a partial answer, requiring
that professionals "participate in the operation or management of
the enterprise."4
The Reves "operation or management" test is a restrictive
interpretation of § 1962(c) and will make it difficult (though not
impossible5 ) for plaintiffs to collect damages from auditors, who
are generally not involved in the operation or management of
their clients' businesses. Less certain, however, is the effect Reves
will have on the liability of other professionals under § 1962(c).
The Reves Court adopted a test applicable to all professionals,
but its holding depended strongly on the precise nature of the
auditor's services. Thus, to the extent that a particular
professional's services, as compared to an auditor's, are more
t AtB. 1992, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 1995, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
' Pub L No 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 941 (1970), codified as amended at 18 USC §§ 1961-
1968 (1988 & Supp 1992).
2 See 18 USC § 1963 (criminal penalties); 18 USC § 1964(d) (civil damages).
18 USC § 1962(c).
4 113 S Ct 1163, 1173 (1993).
' The Reves Court specifically noted that its holding did not close the door on
professionals' § 1962(c) liability. Id.
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intimately connected with management, Reves will provide less
protection.
Purportedly using Reves as a guide, nearly all lower courts
that have since considered attorney liability under § 1962(c) have
exonerated the defendants, finding that where an attorney pro-
vides nothing more than "legal services," she cannot be said to
have participated in the operation or management of an enter-
prise. The "legal services" standard, however, misinterprets Reves
by mechanically applying the inapposite model of auditor services
and disregarding the unique qualities of the attorney-client
relationship. This approach permits too many attorneys to escape
liability where, under a proper reading of Reves, they should not
be so lucky. This Comment explores the advantages and disad-
vantages of the current standard and suggests an approach more
faithful to the Reves analysis, the goals underlying RICO, and
business and economic realities. Part I briefly examines the
setting in which the Supreme Court decided Reves. Part II de-
scribes and assesses the lower courts' application of Reves to
attorney liability under § 1962(c). Finally, Part III rejects the
current legal services approach in favor of a more nuanced stan-
dard which more accurately reflects both the spirit and the letter
of Reves.
I. APPLICABILITY OF § 1962(C) TO PROFESSIONALS BEFORE REVES
A. Section 1962(c) in Context
To assess the current standard for determining whether an
attorney has operated or managed an enterprise, it is first useful
to explore the goals of RICO. If a standard applying the Reves
test can be developed that better comports with RICO's goals, it
should be preferred over the current approach. This subsection
examines RICO's structure and goals and fits § 1962(c) within the
statutory scheme.
Congressional debates reveal a uniform, broad goal behind
RICO's enactment: the eradication of organized crime.' Congress
enacted RICO to assist prosecutors in dismantling organized
criminal enterprises from top to bottom,' including eliminating
' See 84 Stat at 923 (Congress passed the Act "to seek the eradication of organized
crime... [by] providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies.").
See 116 Cong Rec 18939 (June 9, 1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan). See
generally David B. Smith and Terrance G. Reed, Civil RICO § 1.01 (Matthew Bender,
1993).
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the "infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legiti-
mate organizations."'
Courts have often justified expanding RICO's reach on the
basis of its broad language9 and Congress's sweeping intentions
as evidenced by RICO's liberal construction clause.1" Yet RICO
has limits, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Reves" and as
other courts had previously recognized. 2 Nevertheless, Congress
clearly intended that courts interpret RICO liberally in order to
realize the statute's purpose: the eradication of organized
crime. 3
To further its goal of eradicating organized crime, RICO
establishes both a civil remedy 4 and criminal penalties. 5 Civil-
RICO plaintiffs must demonstrate injury to business or proper-
ty16 stemming from at least one of four types of violations. 7 All
' Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S Rep No 91-617, 91st Cong, 1st Sess 76
(1969). While most of the legislative history leading to RICO focuses on the need to
eradicate the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized criminal organizations,
RICO's scope includes the infiltration of illegitimate businesses as well. See United States
v Turkette, 452 US 576, 590-91 (1981).
' See, for example, H.J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 US 229 (1989).
Although Congress's stated and proximate purpose in enacting RICO was combatting
organized crime, id at 245, Congress consciously adopted "commodious language capable
of extending beyond organized crime." Id at 246.
10 RICO's liberal construction clause provides that "[tihe provisions of this title shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 84 Stat at 947.
" 113 S Ct at 1172 (noting the clause "is not an invitation to apply RICO to new
purposes that Congress never intended," but rather an aid for resolving ambiguity), citing
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473 US 479, 492 n 10 (1985).
2 See, for example, Grider v Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir
1989) ("[The general principle that RICO is to be accorded a liberal interpretation cannot
justify expanding [the statute] beyond the limits of [its] own language."); Ouaknine v
MacFarlane, 897 F2d 75, 83 (2d Cir 1990) (stating undue application of the liberal con-
struction clause would "permit abrogation of the explicit words of the statute").
" See text accompanying notes 6-8. There is a natural tension between the statutory
language of "a carefully crafted piece of legislation," lanelli v United States, 420 US 770,
789 (1975), and the liberal construction clause. See also Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A
Definitive Guide § 3 at 3-4 (ABA, 1992) (noting that a liberal construction may be neces-
sary in cases not involving organized crime because "any stinting construction may also
apply in organized crime prosecutions").
14 18 USC § 1964.
15 18 USC § 1963.
1 18 USC § 1964(c).
17 Section 1962 contains three causes of action in addition to § 1962(c). Under §
1962(a), it is unlawful to invest income derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" to
acquire an interest in, or to establish or operate any enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition of an interest in,
or control of, any enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity. Finally, 1962(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c). Parties may also be liable for aiding and
abetting a violation of § 1962. See Joseph, Civil RICO § 17 at 108-10 (cited in note 13).
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RICO causes of action require the plaintiff to allege the existence
of an enterprise, 8 racketeering activity,19 a pattern of racke-
teering activity,0 and an effect on interstate or foreign com-
merce. In addition, a plaintiff must establish certain elements
specific to the type of violation alleged. Section 1962(c) describes
the type of violation most often attributed to accountants, attor-
neys, and other professionals:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associat-
ed with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.2'
Thus, in addition to the elements common to all RICO causes of
action, § 1962(c) requires that the defendant be employed by or
associated with the enterprise, that the defendant and the enter-
prise be separate entities,22 and, most important for purposes of
this Comment, that the defendant have participated in the con-
duct of the enterprise's affairs.
18 Defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 18 USC § 1961(4).
9 Defined by an exhaustive list of predicate acts for the purposes of a RICO violation,
including mail, wire, and securities fraud; witness, victim, or informant tampering; and
extortion. 18 USC § 1961(1).
20 A "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity.., the last of which occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 USC § 1961(5). See
also H.J., Inc., 492 US at 238 ("Section 1961(5) concerns only the minimum number of
predicates necessary to establish a pattern; and it assumes that there is something to a
RICO pattern beyond simply the number of predicate acts involved.") (emphasis omitted).
21 18 USC § 1962(c).
' See, for example, McCullough v Suter, 757 F2d 142, 144 (7th Cir 1985) (reasoning
that the "person" who allegedly violates section 1962(c) must be distinct from the enter-
prise whose affairs that person is allegedly conducting because "you cannot associate with
yourself"). But see United States v Hartley, 678 F2d 961, 986-990 (11th Cir 1982) (noting
that a corporation can both be a named defendant and satisfy the enterprise require-
ment). See also Davis J. Howard, Moving to Dismiss a Civil RICO Action, 35 Cleve St L
Rev 423, 436-40 (1987) (noting the majority rule that "person" must be distinct from
"enterprise" for purposes of § 1962(c)); Douglas E. Abrams, The Law of Civil RICO § 4.7.1
at 223 n 4 (Little, Brown, 1991) (collecting cases).
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B. Professionals' Liability in the Pre-Reves World
Most civil-RICO suits allege a violation of § 1962(c).' Suits
against professionals usually include a § 1962(c) or § 1962(d) alle-
gation, because it is much more likely that a professional has
participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs,' or con-
spired to do so,25 rather than invested in,2" or acquired an in-
terest in or control of,27 their client's enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.
The Reves Court's recent interpretation of 1962(c)'s "conduct
or participate" element will undoubtedly affect a plaintiff's abili-
ty to state a claim against a professional for damages caused by
the professional's allegedly inappropriate behavior. To clarify
Reves's impact on attorneys' liability, this subsection briefly ex-
plores the continuum of tests developed by the circuit courts prior
to Reves.
1. Suing professionals under § 1962(c) in the pre-Reves world.
While suits under other subsections of § 1962 were possible,
pre-Reves lawsuits against professionals such as lawyers," ac-
countants," investment bankers,0  and others" were typically
' See Abrams, Civil RICO § 4.7.1 at 222, citing Arthur F. Mathews, et al, Report of
the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law 57 (ABA, 1985) (estimating that 97 percent of civil-RICO claims alleged a
§ 1962(c) violation).
2 See 18 USC § 1962(c). See also C. Stephen Howard, Payne L. Templeton, and
Devan D. Beck, RICO Claims Against Accountants After Reves v. Ernst & Young, 467
PLI/Lit 291 (1993) (accountants are most often sued under § 1962(c) and the conspiracy
subsection, 1962(d)); Counsel or Conspirator?, Cal Lawyer 33 (June 1993) (noting section
1962(c) is used most frequently to plead RICO claims against outside professionals).
See 18 USC § 1962(d).
See 18 USC § 1962(a).
See 18 USC § 1962(b).
See, for example, Bennett v Berg, 710 F2d 1361, 1364-65 (8th Cir 1983) (en banc)
(holding sufficient attorney participation in conduct must be alleged to support a § 1962(c)
claim); Blake v Dierdorff, 856 F2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir 1988) (holding allegations sufficient
to implicate attorneys); Odesser v Continental Bank, 676 F Supp 1305, 1312-13 (E D Pa
1987) (holding claims under §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d) sufficient).
' See, for example, Bank ofAmerica v Touche Ross & Co., 782 F2d 966, 968-69 (11th
Cir 1986) (involving § 1962(c) and § 1962(d) violations); Goldman v McMahan, Brafman,
Morgan & Co., 706 F Supp 256, 261-62 (S D NY 1989) (section 1962(c) claim against
accountant inadequate).
' See, for example, Rodriguez v Banco Central, 727 F Supp 759, 772 (D Puerto Rico
1989) (declining to dismiss plaintiff's § 1962(c) claim).
31 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F2d 948, 950 (DC Cir 1990) (en banc) (labor unions); City of New York v Joseph L. Balkan,
Inc., 656 F Supp 536, 541 (E D NY 1987) (contractors); Gilbert v Prudential-Bache Securi-
ties, Inc., 643 F Supp 107, 108-09 (E D Pa 1986) (brokerage firm); General Accident In-
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based on § 1962(c). Before Reves, a professional's liability depend-
ed in large part on the particular circuit's interpretation of the §
1962(c) "conduct or participate" element.
The Second Circuit, for example, adopted an expansive view
of what constitutes such activity. That circuit maintained that a
defendant conducted the activities of an enterprise when (1) the
defendant was "enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely
by virtue of [his or her] position in the enterprise or involvement
in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate
offenses [were] related to the activities of that enterprise."32 The
defendant-professional thus faced liability for merely committing
predicate acts somehow related to the enterprise or the
defendant's position within it.
Particularly devastating to professionals was the Eleventh
Circuit's "benefits" test, which concluded that "[t]he word
'conduct' in § 1962(c) simply means the performance of activities
necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise."3 Under
this test, a defendant who aided the enterprise in any way
through a pattern of racketeering activity was liable under RICO.
The Eighth and D.C. Circuits employed tests more favorable
to professional defendants. Under the Eighth Circuit test, the
defendant must have been involved in the operation or manage-
ment of the enterprise to be liable under § 1962(c). 4 The D.C.
Circuit adopted a stricter version of the Eighth Circuit's test,
requiring the defendant to exercise "significant control over or
within an enterprise."35
surance Co. of America v Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 598 F Supp 1223, 1241 (E
D Pa 1984) (banks).
32 United States v Scotto, 641 F2d 47, 54 (2d Cir 1980) (holding that defendants had
participated in the conduct of a union's affairs when they committed crimes they could
only commit by virtue of their union positions). The Third and Ninth Circuits followed
Scotto. See United States v Provenzano, 688 F2d 194, 200 (3d Cir 1982); United States v
Yarbrough, 852 F2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir 1988). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits followed a
more restrictive version of Scotto, making the test conjunctive rather than disjunctive.
See, for example, Overnite Transportation Co. v Local No. 705, 904 F2d 391, 393 (7th Cir
1990) ("(1) The defendant must have committed the racketeering acts; (2) the defendant's
position in or relationship with the enterprise facilitated the commission of the acts; and,
(3) the acts had some effect on the enterprise."); United States v Cauble, 706 F2d 1322,
1332-33 (5th Cir 1983) (same test).
' Bank of America, 782 F2d at 970. But see United States v Webster, 669 F2d 185,
186 (4th Cir 1982); United States v Kovic, 684 F2d 512, 516 (7th Cir 1982) (both rejecting
the benefits test).
' Bennett, 710 F2d at 1364 (dicta) ("A defendant's participation must be in the con-
duct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participation
in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.").
' Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F2d at 954.
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2. The Reves test.
In Reves v Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court adopted the
Eighth Circuit's relatively permissive operation-or-management
test.36 In Reves, a Farmer's Cooperative ("the Co-op") sold de-
mand notes that became virtually worthless after the Co-op de-
clared bankruptcy.37 Purchasers of the notes sued Arthur Young
and Company, 8 the accounting firm hired to audit the Co-op's
books, alleging that their fraudulent valuation of a gasohol plant
made the Co-op appear solvent, thus inducing the plaintiffs to
purchase the notes.39 The issue before the Supreme Court in
Reves was the Eighth Circuit's affirmance of summary judgment
in favor of Arthur Young on petitioners' RICO claim.4" The
Eighth Circuit had applied the operation-or-management test
first adopted in Bennett v Berg,4 finding that Arthur Young's
conduct, however negligent or reckless, did not "rise to the level
of participation in the management or operation of the Co-op."42
The Court affirmed, finding the more restrictive operation-or-
management test consistent with RICO's statutory language.'
The Court held that § 1962(c)'s language requires a defendant to
have participated in the direction of the enterprise, and be some-
113 S Ct at 1173.
37 Id at 1168.
' The purchasers originally sued 40 individuals and entities; all but Arthur Young
settled. Id. During the events giving rise to the litigation, Arthur Young and Company
merged with Russell Brown and Company; the merged firm later became Ernst & Young.
Id at 1167. This Comment follows the Court's convention of using Arthur Young's name
throughout.
' See id at 1167-69. The controversy over the valuation concerned the date the Co-op
acquired the plant. In 1980, the Co-op's general manager, Jack White, began borrowing
from the Co-op to finance the construction of the plant by his own company, White Flame
Fuels, Inc. By the end of 1980, White owed the Co-op approximately $4 million. Several
months later, the Co-op's board agreed to purchase White Flame.
The Co-op hired Arthur Young to perform its 1981 audit. One key requirement of the
audit was the assessment of an accountant's valuation of the gasohol plant. The auditor
used the accountant's $4.5 million value, which assumed counter-factually that the Co-op
had owned White Flame from the beginning of the plant's construction in 1979. Had the
Co-op purchased the plant from White, the plant would have to have been valued at its
fair market value, which was between $444,000 and $1.5 million. If the valuation were
any lower than $1.5 million, the Co-op would have been insolvent. Arthur Young present-
ed its audit report without telling the Co-op's board of its conclusion that the Co-op
always had owned the plant, or that but for this key assumption, the Co-op would be
insolvent. Id at 1166-67.
'0 Id at 1169.
4' 710 F2d at 1364.
42 Arthur Young & Co. v Reves, 937 F2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir 1991).
"' Reves, 113 S Ct at 1170.
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how involved in the decision-making process." In adopting the
Eighth Circuit's test, the Supreme Court rejected the various
tests developed by other circuits. The Court implicitly rejected
the Second Circuit's expansive test, noting that mere participa-
tion in an enterprise's affairs cannot be grounds for a § 1962(c)
violation.45 The Court also implicitly rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's approach, noting that the word "conduct" requires more
than minimal participation or assistance.46 Thus, after Reves, it
is not enough that a professional is enabled to commit predicate
acts through her position in an enterprise, or that the profession-
al assisted in the commission of such act. The Court explicitly
rejected the most restrictive test, set forth by the D.C. Circuit. As
the Court noted, a defendant need not exercise "significant con-
trol over or within an enterprise" to be liable.47 The Court there-
fore adopted a restrictive, but not the most restrictive, reading of
the language of § 1962(c).
The Reves Court's interpretation will have its greatest im-
pact on the liability of "outsiders," including attorneys, who are
associated with the enterprise but are not employees. The Court
noted that its decision would not affect outsider liability under
subsections 1962(a) and (b)," and that outsider liability under §
1962(c) requires an association with the enterprise and participa-
tion "in the conduct of its affairs-that is, participat[ion] in the
operation or management of the enterprise itself. . . .49 The
Court rejected the notion that its decision immunized outsiders
from § 1962(c) liability, suggesting that an enterprise may be
managed or operated by outsiders when they "exert control" over
the enterprise.0
4 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id at 1169 & n 3.
"' Id at 1170 n 4, quoting Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F2d at 954 (emphasis added in
Reves).
' Reves, 113 S Ct at 1173. Section 1962(b) would require the outsider-professional to
commit a pattern of racketeering activity and acquire an interest in an enterprise through
a pattern of illegal activity. Thus, a professional who acquires a position in an enterprise
and then commits a series of predicate acts is not liable under § 1962(b). Similarly, to be
liable under § 1962(a), a professional would have to invest income derived from rack-
eteering in the client enterprise-rare for a professional. See text accompanying notes 23-
27. See also ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-2 & 5-3 (1983) (advising
lawyers to refrain from maintaining financial interests in property in which the client has
a financial interest).
49 113 S Ct at 1173.
50 Id.
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II. THE EFFECT OF REVES ON ATTORNEYS
The Reves Court adopted the operation-or-management test
and applied it to one type of outside professional, an auditor. The
Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that the defendant's
auditing services did not rise to operation or management of the
enterprise. The Reves Court, however, did not specify how courts
should determine whether an outside professional's conduct does
rise to the level of operation or management.
In the wake of Reves, lower courts have responded to the
Supreme Court's incomplete instructions by fashioning their own
standards for assessing whether a defendant-professional has
satisfied the Reves requirement. One would expect these stan-
dards to give different outcomes for different sorts of professional
service providers; after all, some services place the professional
closer to management than others. In evaluating attorney liabili-
ty under § 1962(c) after Reves, however, lower courts have not
paid sufficient attention to the nature of the services provided by
lawyers. Instead, they have uniformly excused attorneys from
liability through application of a crude "legal services" standard.
This Section examines this standard and its many problems, sug-
gesting that this approach oversimplifies Reves and is overprotec-
tive of attorneys.
A. The Gap Between Reves and Attorneys
The operation-or-management test was easy to apply to Ar-
thur Young-and will probably prove easy to apply in most fu-
ture cases involving auditors-because it is difficult to imagine
an auditor's involvement with an enterprise rising to the level of
operation or management. Traditionally, an auditor's role is to
express an opinion on the client's financial statements. 1 Audi-
tors are ethically prohibited from being connected with their
client "as a promoter, underwriter, or voting trustee, a director or
officer or in any capacity equivalent to that of a member of man-
agement or of an employee."52 Even if Arthur Young had ven-
tured beyond its traditionally accepted role, its departure would
most likely not have risen to the level of operation or manage-
"' American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Vol A AICPA Professional
Standards AU § 110.02 at 61 (AICPA, 1986).
52 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Vol B AICPA Professional
Standards ET § 101.01.B.1 at 4411 (AICPA, 1986).
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ment because an auditor's traditional role is so far removed from
that level of participation.53
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the operation-or-manage-
ment test in an easy case, one unlikely to press the limits of the
doctrine. Indeed, the Court explicitly refused to decide "how far §
1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation [to subordinates]
because it is clear that Arthur Young was not acting under the
direction of the Co-op's officers or board. " ' Nor does Reves de-
scribe the degree of participation in management that is neces-
sary for liability. Is day-to-day management required, or is con-
trol over decision making with respect to the particular predicate
acts sufficient?55
Because even the traditional attorney-client relationship is
more complex than that of an auditor and her client, Reves pro-
vides little guidance as to when an attorney will be liable under §
1962(c). Applying the operation-or-management test to attorneys
who have committed predicate acts while rendering services to
clients presents additional questions. The nature of an attorney's
services is much different from an auditor's, and an attorney's
role is much more likely to present a hard case. Auditors provide
an objective view of their clients' books, so an auditor's tradition-
al services should not affect the way that a client conducts her
business.56 An attorney's professional role, however, is often to
suggest how a company might change its course of conduct to
avoid legal liability or to engage in a profitable commercial trans-
action. An attorney's legal advice will inevitably shape the course
of a corporation's actions and is likely to have a concrete effect on
a company's future plans. Moreover, a lawyer's client may sys-
tematically "rubber stamp" her recommendations, invariably
heeding whatever advice the attorney gives. Generally, it seems
' See Reves, 113 S Ct at 1173 ("Although the professional standards adopted by the
accounting profession may be relevant, they do not define what constitutes management
of an enterprise for the purposes of § 1962(c).").
Id at 1173 n9.
Under" CERCLA, for example, a person who maintains an indicia of ownership
(such as a lender) in a facility is not liable for environmental response costs unless that
person "participates] in the management" of the facility. See 40 CFR § 300.1100 (1993).
As in the RICO context, courts differed as to when a lender had met this portion of the
test. The EPA has interpreted CERCLA to require the holder of a security interest to
engage in decision-making control or day-to-day management over environmental deci-
sions before being liable. See 40 CFR § 300.1100(c).
' If the auditor refuses to approve the client's books, the auditor might indirectly
change the way the client crunches its numbers, so that the financial reports ultimately
become more accurate. However, an auditor's purpose, unlike an attorney's, is not to
change or directly affect the client's course of conduct.
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more likely that an attorney's conduct, rather than an auditor's,
will be deemed operation or management of an enterprise. Put
another way, an attorney may be able to exert control57 over a
client's enterprise without going beyond traditional roles.
In addition, the scope of an attorney's services is much
broader and more dynamic than that of an auditor's. While an
auditor's primary function is to scrutinize a firm's financial state-
ments and business data, an attorney's functions or purposes are
not well defined, and are constantly changing." Moreover, attor-
ney-client relationships suffer from fewer restrictions than audi-
tor-client relationships. Unlike auditors, attorneys are not forbid-
den from taking a managerial role in their clients' businesses.59
In fact, many law firms have partners who serve on boards of
directors of their clients' corporations. ° Attorneys can and do
play active roles in their clients' businesses by promoting deals,
soliciting investors, and conducting meetings at the firm." Ap-
plying Reves in these situations is equally problematic.
"7 See Reves, 113 S Ct at 1173 (suggesting that an outsider able to exert control may
be liable under § 1962(c)).
' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility provide suggested ethical guidelines to states regulating attorney conduct, but these
guidelines in no way limit the broad range of permissible services that lawyers can
render. For example, in 1991, the ABA adopted Model Rule 5.7, which was designed to
restrict the movement of law firms into ancillary non-legal businesses (such as investment
banking) by limiting a law firm's provision of these services to those hiring the firm for its
legal services. One year later, the ABA repealed Rule 5.7. See Stephen Gillers and Roy D.
Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 236 (Little, Brown, 1993).
Those opposing the Rule argued that it amounted to a "sweeping condemnation" of ancil-
lary services that have been provided by attorneys "for generations." See id at 246-47. In
other words, the Rule attempted to separate legal from non-legal services, defining the
latter as "ancillary," even though those "ancillary" services (such as trust, financial
planning, and general insurance services) have been traditionally offered by lawyers to
clients. With or without Rule 5.7, it is unclear how courts applying the legal services
standard, see text accompanying notes 62-64, would analyze these ancillary, "non-legal"
services.
5 See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 13.7.4 at 783-39 (West, 1986).
® Thomas W. Hyland, Law Firm's Exposure to Third Parties-An Expanding Doc-
trine, Lawyers' Liab Rev Q J 1, 3 (Apr 1992) (study finding that 68.2% of law firms with
41 or more lawyers had members who served as directors and officers of client corpora-
tions, while 40% of firms with fewer than 10 lawyers had members on their clients'
boards).
61 George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma
of Corporate Counsel, 39 Hastings L J 605, 614 (1988).
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B. Shortcomings of the Existing Standard
1. The legal services standard defined.
In fashioning a standard to determine whether an attorney
has operated or managed an enterprise, courts have attempted to
apply Reves's auditor analysis to attorneys, effectively ignoring
the difference between lawyers and auditors. Using this stan-
dard, courts have invariably granted summary dismissal of §
1962(c) claims against attorneys on the ground that the attorneys
were not involved in the operation or management of the alleged
enterprise.62 The dispositive factor in all cases applying Reves to
attorneys has been that the attorney did no more than provide
legal services, in some cases unprofessionally, to the client.'
Courts typically interpret Reves to mean that where an attorney's
role is "limited to providing legal services," whether the services
are rendered "well or poorly, properly or improperly," the attor-
ney is not liable."
2. The legal services standard misapplies Reves.
This "legal services" standard-asking whether an attorney's
role was limited to providing legal services-is a deceptively
simple standard arising from an overly broad reading of Reves.
6 See, for example, Baumer v Pachl, 8 F3d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir 1993) (dismissing a §
1962(c) claim against an attorney who did not play "any part in directing the affairs of the
enterprise"); Sassoon v Altgelt, 777, Inc., 822 F Supp 1303, 1307 (N D Ill 1993) (dismissing
a § 1962(c) claim against attorneys who drafted a limited partnership offering and provid-
ed legal services to the partnership); Gilmore v Berg, 820 F Supp 179, 183 (D NJ 1993)
(dismissing a § 1962(c) claim because the allegedly false private placement memoranda
were "common professional services typically rendered by attorneys for their business
clients"); Morin v Trupin, 832 F Supp 93, 98 (S D NY 1993) (dismissing a § 1962(c) claim
because drafting legal correspondence and directing clients to sign prepared documents
did not rise to operation or management); Charmarac Properties, Inc. v Pike, 1993 Fed
Secur L Rptr (CCH) 97802, 97951 (S D NY 1993) (dismissing a § 1962(c) claim because
the complaint failed to allege an attorney's control or direction over the enterprise). See
also Nolte v Pearson, 994 F2d 1311, 1314, 1317 (8th Cir 1993) (affirming a directed verdict
for defendant attorneys who prepared allegedly false opinion letters and other informa-
tional memoranda). But see Crowe v Smith, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 3884, *22-23 (W D La)
(denying attorneys' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claim because, under facts
alleged in complaint, operation or management "could be found").
' See, for example, Baumer, 8 F3d at 1344 (finding an attorney whose role was
"limited to providing legal services" not liable under Reves test); Sassoon, 822 F Supp at
1307 (providing legal services insufficient for § 1962(c) liability after Reves); Gilmore, 820
F Supp at 182-83 (same); Morin, 832 F Supp at 98 (same); Nolte, 994 F2d at 1317 (same).
" Baumer, 8 F3d at 1344. See also Nolte, 994 F2d at 1317; Charmarac Properties,
1993 Fed Secur L Rptr at 97951-52 (allegations of attorney's unprofessional conduct and
performance of legal services insufficient to state a § 1962(c) claim).
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By misinterpreting Reves's application of the operation-or-man-
agement test, courts absolve too many attorneys of § 1962(c)
liability.
The Reves Court noted that Arthur Young's conduct did not
usurp management's responsibility and conformed to the AICPA's
professional standards, at least with respect to the generation of
the Co-op's financial statements. 5 The majority specifically con-
sidered the nature of the services Arthur Young performed and
concluded that they did not rise to the level of operation or man-
agement of the enterprise." Thus, the case should not be read
too broadly: Reves only holds (1) that performing traditional
auditing tasks is insufficient to trigger liability, and (2) that
§ 1962(c)'s "conduct or participate" element requires operation or
management, making it more difficult for "outsiders" to meet
than some of the lower courts had thought. 7
Courts applying Reves have consistently and correctly recog-
nized that Arthur Young was not, and could not be, liable for per-
forming traditional auditing functions.68 Yet these courts have
inappropriately read Reves too broadly when applying it to at-
torneys. In so doing, they have created a standard that warps the
narrow decision in Reves and has the potential of corrupting
RICO's goals.
The legal services standard asks whether the attorney's role
was confined to giving legal services, and if it was, simply ab-
solves the attorney of liability.69 Some courts applying Reves to
cases involving attorneys reason that since Arthur Young was
not liable for performing traditional auditing services, attorneys
are not liable under the operation-or-management test if they
perform traditional legal services, even if their conduct is un-
professional.7 ° Other courts simply assert that after Reves, attor-
6 113 S Ct at 1173-74.
66 Id at 1174.
6 Id at 1173. See also text accompanying notes 43-50.
6 See, for example, Baumer, 8 F3d at 1344; Biofeedtrac, Inc. v Kolinor Optical
Enterprises, 832 F Supp 585, 591 (E D NY 1993).
6 Possibly, courts applying the legal services standard are implicitly defining "legal
services" as only those activities that would not give rise to Reves liability. If so, the stan-
dard is circular and completely useless as a guide for determining liability of attorneys,
saying, in effect, that attorneys are not liable when they perform services that do not give
rise to liability.
70 The most blatant statement of this misinterpretation appears in Biofeedtrac, 832 F
Supp at 590-92. There, the court first noted that Justice Souter, in his dissent in Reves,
claimed that Arthur Young had stepped into the shoes of management by creating the
very financial statements they audited. Id at 591. The Reves majority did not respond
directly to Souter's claim, but the Biofeedtrac court noted that "in rejecting [Souter's]
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neys whose role is limited to providing legal services are not lia-
ble under § 1962(c).7 This "legal services" standard ignores the
Court's emphasis on the nature of the services that Arthur Young
rendered. As an auditor, Arthur Young's traditional role would
come nowhere near even the operation-or-management test's
nebulous threshold.
Reves did not suggest that an outside attorney who performs
only legal services cannot operate or manage an enterprise. Rec-
ognizing the differences between auditors and attorneys, it is
illogical to extend, unmodified, the Reves methodology to attor-
neys. Given the amorphous nature of attorney services, it is inap-
propriate to assert, as the legal services standard does, that
"merely" rendering legal services cannot trigger RICO liability
after Reves.
3. Further difficulties with the legal services standard.
a) Lack of a definition. Although the legal services stan-
dard obviously requires a more precise definition of "legal servic-
es," no court has attempted to provide one. As a result, the stan-
dard gives attorneys no guidance as to how they should limit
their roles in client activities, if at all. This invites courts to be
inconsistent when they are faced with hard cases.
For example, in Biofeedtrac, Inc. v Kolinor Optical Enterpris-
es, the court seemed unsure whether participation on the board
of directors of a client's corporation was a legal service. 2 The
court noted that "[c]orporate counsel customarily fill such roles,"
insisting that attorneys could participate on the board of direc-
tors "without becoming a part of the operation or management of
view, the Court held, by its silence, that even when professionals go beyond their custom-
ary role, they will not be deemed to have participated" in an enterprise's operation or
management. Id. The Biofeedtrac court reads Reves as protecting any professional per-
forming only "traditional" services. However, the Reves holding only suggests that audi-
tors will not be liable if they perform traditional services. There is no logical reason why a
professional cannot perform "traditional" services (as defined by the profession) and at the
same time operate or manage an enterprise.
" See, for example, Baumer, S F3d at 1344 ("[Defendant-attorney's] role was limited
to providing legal services .... Whether [defendant] rendered his services well or poorly,
properly or improperly, is irrelevant to the Reves test. We are therefore compelled to con-
clude that... the complaint fails to allege a 1962(c) cause of action .... ."); Gilmore, 820 F
Supp at 182 (Defendant's actions "merely constituted the rendition of professional ser-
vices .... Such conduct does not constitute participation in the direction of the affairs" of
the enterprise involved.); Morin, 832 F Supp at 98 ("Defendants' conduct consisted of
providing legal services .... This is not, under Reves, sufficient to support liability under
§ 1962(c)."); Sassoon, 822 F Supp at 1307.
7 832 F Supp at 591.
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the enterprise."73 After Biofeedtrac, it is unclear which functions
an attorney may assume as a corporate director without risking
RICO liability.
Without a concrete definition of a legal service, courts are
bound to face cases in which the ill-defined legal services stan-
dard leads them to a questionable result. Biofeedtrac itself illus-
trates how broadly "legal services" can be defined. There, the
plaintiff corporation entered into an agreement with Kolinor to
distribute vision-training devices for which the plaintiff held pat-
ents. 4 After meeting the principals of Kolinor, an attorney,
Christopher Kuehn, left a New York law firm to start his own
practice with Kolinor as his sole client. The plaintiff alleged that
Kuehn was actively involved in a fraud involving production of a
competing vision trainer. Not only did Kuehn incorporate two
corporations whose apparent purpose was to develop and manu-
facture the competing device, he also served as the sole director
of the newly formed corporations.75 Despite this extensive and
ongoing participation by an "outside" attorney in his only client's
fraudulent activities,76 the court held that the Reues test was
not satisfied because Kuehn's role was limited to providing legal
advice and services. The court even found that Kuehn's sugges-
tion to Kolinor that Kuehn enter into negotiations with the plain-
tiff to mask Kolinor's scheme fell within the realm of legal
services.77
Importantly, however, the Biofeedtrac court stressed that
Kuehn did not have an employment contract with his client, had
no vote as a shareholder in the corporation, received no remuner-
ation other than fees for legal services, and at "no time ... par-
ticipate[d] in or even offer[ed] an opinion regarding a business
point."7" If the court believed that providing legal services was
insufficient to trigger liability, this language suggests what addi-
tional facts might have satisfied the Reves test. Perhaps Kuehn
could have been held liable had he performed these tasks; but,
once again, the court's failure to draw a clear distinction between
legal services and operation or management, while at the same
' Id.
4 Id at 587.
7 Id at 587-88.
"" The Biofeedtrac court did not consider Kuehn an "insider" despite his role as direc-
tor of the newly formed corporations. See id at 591.
7 Id.
78 Id.
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time implicitly assuming such a line exists, provides little
guidance.
b) Failure to consider context. The legal services stand-
ard fails to consider the context in which the service is rendered.
Usually, the provision of legal services is negotiated at arm's
length, with a client approaching a law firm requesting that the
firm perform certain legal services. However, a law firm can per-
form the same legal services in a much different context, with the
firm and the client working toward a common, illegitimate goal,
or with the firm following its own agenda. One can think of nu-
merous cases, where, irrespective of context, attorney conduct
ventures so far beyond providing legal services that the opera-
tion-or-management standard is met.79 Still, the standard's fail-
ure to consider the context in which the legal service is rendered
can be problematic. A law firm's performing a legal service in
response to a client's request is a much different case from a law
firm's approaching a long-time client and "suggesting" that the
same service be rendered. In both cases, the law firm's activities
are arguably limited to rendering legal services, but the services
are rendered in quite different contexts. In the latter case, the
opportunity for an attorney to operate a RICO "enterprise"
through her "suggestions" is much greater.
A corollary of this failure to consider context is the legal
services standard's tendency to discount the relationship between
a client and her attorney. For example, though it may be consid-
ered a legal service, an attorney's position on a client's board of
directors seems likely to fall under the Reves operation-or-man-
agement test. In applying the legal services standard, one court
noted that even if the law firm defendant had "substantial per-
suasive power to induce management to take certain actions,"0
it would not be enough to meet the Reves test as long as the
firm's conduct consisted of "providing legal services.""' But noth-
ing in Reves indicates that a firm with influence and power can-
" For example, an attorney could exert control over an enterprise through bribery.
See Reves, 113 S Ct at 1173. In such a case, an attorney might bribe a manager or execu-
tive of a corporation to take certain actions or allow the law firm to perform legal services
that would further the firm's objectives. Applying the legal services standard-without
regard to the transaction's context-suggests bribery would amount to the operation or
management of the enterprise.
' Morin, 832 F Supp at 98.
81 Id.
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not be participating in the operation or management of its
client.82
III. REPLACING THE LEGAL SERVICES STANDARD
The legal services standard is overprotective because it auto-
matically exonerates attorneys who participate in the operation
or management of an enterprise while performing only legal
services. Courts would more faithfully conform to the Reves test
in attorney-defendant cases if they focused on the "exert control"
language in Reves,' as well as on RICO's goal of attacking the
"infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations."" This Section suggests three factors that courts
should consider to determine whether an attorney's conduct
amounts to participation in the operation or management of the
client's business.'
A. Searching for Indicative Factors
As discussed above, one of the fundamental flaws of the
current legal services standard is that it does not define the scope
of a legal service. Because the nature of an attorney's profession
is so dynamic, it is difficult-if not impossible-to reach a coher-
ent definition that is fluid enough to change with the profession.
The legal services standard gives a court wide and unguided
discretion in applying the Reves test since each court may define
legal services to match its taste and the particular facts of the
case.
In considering whether an attorney has participated in the
operation or management of an enterprise, courts should examine
the attorney's actual conduct and the specific services rendered.
A mere breach of ethical or professional guidelines and stand-
' In fact, the Court specifically noted that an enterprise might be operated or man-
aged by others who are able to "exert control" over the enterprise, Reves, 113 S Ct at
1173, but the Court failed to define "exertion of control." A law firm with substantial
persuasive power may well exert de facto control over a client's actions. This idea is
explored in depth in the text accompanying notes 99-105.
'3 113 S Ct at 1173 ("An enterprise also might be 'operated' or 'managed' by others
'associated with' the enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by bribery.").
See S Rep No 91-617 at 76 (cited in note 8). See also text accompanying notes 6-8.
This discussion only addresses the question of whether an attorney or a law firm
has conducted or participated in the affairs of an enterprise. A court finding that the level
of legal services rendered or the relationship between attorney and client would support
liability must still find that the other elements necessary to state a § 1962(c) claim have
been met.
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ards, without more, gives no indication of whether an attorney
has met the Reves test. Because RICO liability requires a pattern
of racketeering activity in addition to participation in operation
or management, meritorious RICO suits will always involve a
breach of the professional code of conduct or responsibility.'
The important question is which legal services are so intimately
related to the operation or management of an enterprise that,
when combined with a pattern of racketeering activity, they give
rise to § 1962(c) liability. Because attorneys' services and client
relationships are so varied, courts need a flexible standard to
apply the Reves test properly. While the Reves majority was si-
lent as to such a standard, both the Reves dissent and post-Reves
courts have pointed to one or more of the following three factors
as important in deciding when conduct rises to operation or man-
agement: the usurpation of management's responsibilities, the
initiation of legal services, and the exercise of persuasive power.
Although receiving brief mention in several cases, none of
these factors has been consistently applied to analyzing attorney
conduct under the operation-or-management test. Nor is it clear
how a court mentioning one of these factors would integrate it
into the legal services standard.
Rather than asking whether an attorney's conduct has been
confined to providing legal services, a court should ask whether
any one or more of these three indicative factors were present
during the provision of those services. A significant presence of
any one of the factors could indicate participation in operation or
management. Although such an approach necessarily turns on
the facts of each case, it still limits discretion when compared to
the current legal services standard. Currently, attorneys doing
unorthodox work may fear RICO liability because of the uncer-
tainty that their work will not be deemed a "legal service" by a
particular court. A more precise approach would enable courts to
follow Reves more faithfully and afford attorneys the opportunity
to plan their behavior to avoid RICO liability.
" See Rule 8.4, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, declaring it professional mis-
conduct to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty[, or]
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
See also Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A), providing that lawyers
shall not:
(3) engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude[, or]
(4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
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1. Factor one: usurping management's responsibilities.
One of the most obvious, but difficult, ways to determine
whether an attorney has participated in the operation or man-
agement of an enterprise is to ask whether the attorney has
usurped the responsibilities of managers, directors, or other deci-
sion makers. The Reves Court suggested that if Arthur Young
had performed tasks that were management's responsibility, this
would have satisfied the operation-or-management test.87 Thus,
in looking at the attorney's services, a court should look at
whether, in performing them, the attorney in effect made deci-
sions that the enterprise's decision makers usually make, or that
decision makers in other businesses traditionally make."
The usurpation factor would cover two ways in which an
attorney may participate in the operation or management of an
enterprise. First, the client might delegate to the attorney a task
traditionally performed by management or provided by law to be
management's responsibility. Second, an attorney could act with-
out obtaining the approval of management or the directors of a
corporation.
The Reves decision raises several questions about how to
apply the usurpation factor. For example, the extent to which
professionals must participate in the operation or management of
the enterprise's affairs to be liable under § 1962(c) remains un-
settled. Is an attorney who makes one managerial decision, ac-
companied by a pattern of racketeering activity, liable under §
1962(c), or must the attorney manage the enterprise on a day-to-
day basis? 9
The answer seems to be that any level of participation in the
management of a firm is sufficient, so long as the participation
occurs through the predicate acts comprising the pattern of rack-
eteering activity. The Reves Court acknowledged that profession-
' The Court suggested that Arthur Young had not generated the representations in
the Co-op's financial statements itself, and had therefore not performed a managerial task
according to AICPA's professional standards. Moreover, the Court noted that the AICPA
standards do not define when an accountant has managed an enterprise. 113 S Ct at
1173-74. Had a lower court found that Arthur Young performed tasks which should have
been performed by management, it seems likely that the Court would have upheld the
decision.
8 The usurpation factor is explicitly delineated in the Reves dissent. Justice Souter
suggests that "[b]y assuming the authority to make key decisions.., and by creating fi-
nancial statements that were the responsibility of the Co-op's management, Arthur Young
crossed the line separating 'outside' auditors from 'inside' financial managers." Id at 1178
(Souter dissenting).
89 See text accompanying notes 54-55.
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al outsiders associated with an enterprise can be liable under its
test,90 but these professionals are unlikely to have a continual
relationship with the enterprise. If day-to-day management of the
enterprise were required, then auditors hired periodically could
never be liable under § 1962(c), a possibility implicitly rejected in
Reves. Moreover, requiring day-to-day operation of the enterprise
would undermine the basic goal of RICO, to prevent the infiltra-
tion of corrupt organizations into legitimate businesses. An attor-
ney, or indeed any professional, need not be involved in daily
decision making to control or otherwise affect the business's
course of conduct.91
The likelihood of an attorney usurping management's respon-
sibilities has increased, especially in the area of securities trans-
actions.2 Attorneys are frequently involved in promoting deals,
soliciting investors, and conducting meetings at the law firm.93
Indeed, attorneys often find themselves at the "fulcrum of corpo-
rate decisionmaking."94 When attorneys make decisions tradi-
tionally made by their clients, they are participating in the op-
eration or management of the enterprise. Of course, there is
nothing ethically or professionally wrong with such participation.
However, when an attorney combines intimate involvement with
a client's decision making with a pattern of racketeering activity,
the aims and goals of RICO demand that such activity be punish-
able under RICO.
90 113 S Ct at 1173.
"' Once a court determines that an attorney has operated or managed an enterprise's
affairs, it must ask whether the operation or management was done "through" a pattern
of racketeering activity. Aside from its bribery example, Reves did not address what it
means to manage an enterprise through such a pattern. Id.
' See, for example, Note, Securities Attorneys Face Liability For Wrongs of Their
Corporate Clients, 5 St John's J Legal Comm 403, 412-14 (1990) (describing the increasing
liability of securities attorneys stemming from competition among law firms and pres-
sures from management to take a more active role in transactions).
Reycraft, 39 Hastings L J at 614 (cited in note 61).
Note, 5 St John's J Legal Comm at 412, citing ABA Committee Discusses Kern
Ruling, Internationalization, SEC Amicus Briefs, 20 Sec Reg & L Rep, 1783, 1786-87 (Nov
25, 1988). The ABA report uses the facts of In the Matter of Allied Stores Corp., 1987 Fed
Sec L Rptr (CCH) J 84,142, to illustrate the degree to which attorneys can become in-
volved in securities transactions. In Allied Stores, the SEC alleged that Kern, a Sullivan
& Cromwell attorney and member of Allied's board of directors, decided, without consult-
ing Allied's managers, other members of the board, or officers, not to disclose certain
information required by law. Id at 88,763-65. In failing to discuss with his clients the
decision not to disclose, Kern effectively met the usurpation test. See also Feit v Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F Supp 544, 575-76 (E D NY 1971) (rejecting an
attorney's attempt to dismiss securities fraud charges against him because he had partici-
pated in the firm's security offerings).
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2. Factor two: initiating legal services.
In some cases, an attorney knowingly assists the client's
illegal activity at the client's request and in furtherance of the
client's goals. This is not enough to trigger § 1962(c) liabili-
ty 95-- the attorney has responded to a client's request, and the
managerial or operational decision was made independently.
Conversely, when an attorney suggests that a certain legal ser-
vice be undertaken, and then commits a predicate RICO act
while performing the service, she might logically be considered to
be operating or managing the client's affairs. Initiation of legal
services is thus a second factor that might indicate to a court
that an attorney has crossed the Reves line into operation or
management.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey suggested the initiation factor in dicta in Gilmore v
Berg.96 Owners of unregistered securities in a limited partner-
ship sued, among others, an attorney, alleging numerous causes
of action, including a violation of RICO. The plaintiffs complained
that the partnership purchased property at an inflated price and
that the transaction was illegal and impaired the value of their
investment. As a part of the private-placement memoranda sent
to the plaintiffs describing the investment, the attorney had
signed a letter stating that the partnership had paid the market
price for the property. 7 After rejecting the plaintiffs' RICO
claim because the defendant had only provided legal services, the
court specifically noted that the plaintiffs failed to show that the
defendant "played any role in initiating or formulating" the
process by which interests in the partnership were sold to the
plaintiffs."8
RICO's goal of preventing the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses provides the strongest justification for including initiation
as a factor in determining when an attorney has met the Reves
test. When an attorney believes that a particular service will
" However, it may be sufficient to trigger aiding and abetting or conspiracy liability
under RICO. See 18 USC §§ 2, 1962(d). For a general discussion of aiding and abetting or
conspiracy liability, see Joseph, Civil Rico § 17 (cited in note 13); Howard, et al, 467
PLILit 291 (cited in note 24) (discussing the likelihood that, after Reves, plaintiffs will
more often plead aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories of liability).
' 820 F Supp 179, 183 (D NJ 1993).
97 Id at 180-81.
' Id at 183. See also Azriella v Cohen Law Offices, 1994 US App LEXIS 6646, *30-31
(2d Cir) (attorney who played "no role in the conception, creation, or execution" of the
fraudulent activity not liable under § 1962(c)).
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benefit her client, the attorney should present the opportunity
and allow the client to decide whether to ultimately retain the
lawyer to perform this service. However, when the lawyer both
suggests that a service be performed and, in the course of per-
forming the service, commits fraud or some other predicate act,
the possibility of infiltration is high enough to justify RICO liabil-
ity. At the very least, when an attorney suggests a course of
action and then pursues it, the attorney has effectively directed
the corporation's affairs.
3. Factor three: exercising persuasive power.
Whether an attorney has participated in operation or man-
agement seems logically to turn on the degree of influence or
persuasive power an attorney has over her client's decision mak-
ing. Although some courts have recognized persuasive power as a
factor, they have held that attorneys exercising even a substan-
tial degree of persuasive power over the decisions of an enter-
prise could not participate in the operation or management of the
enterprise.99 This generalization ignores the realities of many
attorney-client relationships. For example, an attorney who has
earned a great deal of respect and trust among the officers of her
client's corporation may find that managers merely "rubber
stamp" her advice. It seems likely, then, that an attorney might
"exert control" over a manager who knows that if he does not
follow counsel's advice, his actions may be questioned by a supe-
rior.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess when an attorney's
influence is so great that her advice in effect amounts to the
decision of her client. Also, if carelessly applied, the persuasion
factor will punish those attorneys who have developed intimate
relationships with their clients. The enhanced risk of RICO liabil-
ity will discourage attorneys from developing an intimate, trust-
ing relationship-a desirable relationship from the client's per-
spective. Therefore, defining how the persuasive power factor
should be applied requires a delicate balancing of RICO's goals
and client interests.
RICO's goals suggest that a law firm that has developed an
intimate relationship with a client such that the firm's decision is
See Federal Fidelity Savings and Loan Association v Felicetti, 830 F Supp 257, 260
(E D Pa 1993) (Although real estate appraisals "substantially influenced the decision
making" of the enterprise, they did not meet the Reves test.).
[61:11531174
Attorney Liability under RICO
automatically authorized should be punished under RICO if the
firm engages in a pattern of racketeering activity. The risk of
corrupt infiltration and control of the enterprise is greatest after
the law firm has established a trusting relationship and then sets
out to control or manipulate the enterprise or otherwise con-
vinces the enterprise to engage in racketeering activity. Yet
RICO's anti-infiltration goal might undermine attorney-client
relationships if the persuasion factor were overemphasized. How-
ever, if refined, the persuasion factor can provide courts with
useful insight into when attorney influence should factor into the
operation-or-management inquiry. The best way to confine the
persuasion factor is to recognize that a law firm has an incentive
to infiltrate an enterprise or unite in its fraudulent scheme if the
firm stands to gain financially. Unless there is some interconnec-
tion between the firm and the enterprise, a firm's influence will
not be lucrative.
A firm's legal advice generates fees, and fee-generation bene-
fits the firm. However, the legal services must maximize the
enterprise's profits or the enterprise will lose faith in the firm's
advice. Unless the firm has some alternate interest or means of
siphoning off the enterprise's profits, it will not pay for the firm
to infiltrate. Therefore, the persuasion factor should focus not on
the indirect influence that a firm has, but on the incentives a
firm has to engage in prohibited activity. For example, if a firm
receives fees that are tied to a client's profits or a firm has an eq-
uity interest in the client corporation, a court should be less
reluctant to find participation in operation or management.' 0
Along similar lines, if a member of the firm is on the
enterprise's board of directors, a court should consider this a
sufficient meshing of interests to meet the Reves test-at least for
purposes of avoiding summary judgment. Given the incentives
involved, courts should view the participation on a client's board
of directors, or an attorney's equity interest in the enterprise, as
a strong indication of participation in operation or manage-
ment.'0 ' When an attorney is a member of the board of direc-
100 The Biofeedtrac court suggested that this type of influence might be an important
factor in determining an attorney's RICO liability after Reves. 832 F Supp at 591 (noting
that the defendant had received no remuneration other than ordinary fees, had no vote as
a shareholder, and had no employment contract). But see Charmarac, 1993 Fed Secur L
Rptr at 97952 ("[Ulnwarranted and unjustifiable professional fees [do] not save plaintiff's
RICO claim from dismissal.').
.01 Compare Biofeedtrac, where the court places no emphasis on an attorney's partici-
pation on the board of a corporation he formed at his client's direction. 832 F Supp at 591.
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tors of the enterprise, the attorney, either directly or indirectly,
plays "some part in directing"0 2 the enterprise's affairs, and
therefore participates in the operation or management of the
enterprise. Even if the board of directors only makes hiring deci-
sions, the attorney can choose managers who will act in the
attorney's interests as a board member.
If the defendant-lawyer was on the corporate board of direc-
tors, or had an equity interest in the enterprise, these facts
should be prima facie evidence of operation or management in
the enterprise.' Remember, there is no danger of RICO liabili-
ty so long as the attorney does not engage in a pattern of rack-
eteering activity. However, the mixture of such a pattern and a
high-level position in the client firm should be sufficient to trig-
ger RICO liability when it otherwise might not be warranted.
This presumption will no doubt discourage attorneys from
taking board positions. Since corporations value attorneys' input
and can benefit from their board membership, this presumption
arguably disserves corporations. However, outside of RICO, law
firms face similar problems whenever they commit fraud or mal-
practice while a partner serves on the board of directors for a cli-
ent.' Thus many law firms, fearing liability, already urge their
attorneys to refrain from holding an equity interest in a corpo-
rate client or serving on the client's board of directors.0 5 There-
fore, the presumption's impact on attorney behavior may not be
severe.
B. Assessment of the Factor Approach
After analyzing these three factors, a court will be better
able to assess whether an attorney has managed or operated an
,o Reves, 113 S Ct at 1170 (emphasis omitted).
"' This accords with Congress's view of a director's role in other contexts as well. For
example, under FIRREA, federal banking agencies have authority to bring certain en-
forcement actions against an "institution affiliated party," defined as "any director, officer,
employee, or controlling stockholder... or agent for an insured depository institution." 12
USC §§ 1813(u) (Supp 1992). Such institution-affiliated parties, including directors, are
prohibited from "participatfing] in any manner in the conduct of the affairs" of certain
financial institutions once an order has been issued against the affiliate. 18 USC §§
1818(e)(1), 1818(e)(6)(A) (Supp 1992).
'" See, for example, Tim O'Brien, Some Firms Never Learn, Am Lawyer 63, 63-64
(Oct 1989). The Attorney's Liability Assurance Society ("ALAS") prohibits its members
from sitting on the board or being officers of corporate clients. Id at 67. ALAS discourages,
but does not prohibit, equity participation. Id. But see Hyland, Lawyers' Liab Rev Q J at
3 (cited in note 60).
" See Hyland, Lawyer's Liab Rev Q J at 4.
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enterprise. The purpose of the three-factor standard is to force
courts to look at the context in which the services were per-
formed-a context ignored by the legal services standard. After
making the three inquiries, a court will be better able to decide a
summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. As it is unlikely that all three factors will be pres-
ent in one case, the strong presence of one factor should be suffi-
cient to indicate some participation in operation or management.
As with any multi-factor approach, a court has discretion in
determining whether the individual inquiries amount to a con-
clusion that the defendant's actions have triggered potential
liability. However, the discretion courts have under the suggested
approach is preferable to the unguided discretion of the current
legal services standard. Moreover, the three-factor approach
forces courts to justify their decisions after looking at factors that
relate directly to whether an attorney has operated or managed
her client's affairs. Unlike inquiries under the legal services stan-
dard, courts will now be asking the right questions. Asking
whether an attorney provided more than "legal services" is un-
helpful and irrelevant.
To illustrate how a court might apply this approach, consider
the facts of Biofeedtrac.°6 A court would first ask whether
Kuehn, the defendant-attorney, usurped his client's (Jordan's)
decision-making role in the alleged scheme to create a competing
vision trainer. The published facts regarding the Kuehn-Jordan
relationship are sparse, but it does not appear that Kuehn
usurped his client's role in Kolinor Optical Enterprises & Consul-
tants. The decisions regarding the manufacture of the competing
vision-training device seem to have been the client's. °7
However, there is an indication that once Kuehn understood
Kolinor's plan to manufacture a competing vision trainer, he
initiated legal services to further the scheme. Kuehn specifically
suggested to his client that Kuehn, in contract negotiations,
should falsely give the plaintiff the impression that Kolinor was
eager to distribute plaintiff's trainer, which would mask Jordan's
scheme to manufacture a competing device. °'0 While Kuehn
himself suggested that he lie to the plaintiff to further Jordan's
'o' See text accompanying notes 72-78.
107 See Biofeedtrac, 832 F Supp at 587-88 ("Kuehn advised Kolinor regarding its
plan.. . "; "Kolinor decided to distribute its own vision training device... "; Kuehn wrote
a letter to Kolinor's principal, George Jordan, examining the legal risks of "Jordan's
scheme.").
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scheme, this should probably not be deemed "initiation." Jordan
apparently approached Kuehn for assistance with his plan to
develop a competing trainer."9 Thus, Kuehn's suggestion was
in response to the initial request for services and was designed to
further Jordan's own aims.
The third factor, the exercise of persuasive power, weighs
heavily against Kuehn. Once Kuehn knew of Jordan's plan, he
became intimately involved in the scheme and became the sole
director of the corporations that presumably were to control the
manufacture and distribution of the competing device." ° Kuehn
volunteered to act as corporate secretary; he drafted the bylaws,
organizational minutes, shareholder agreements, and business
and organizational plans."' Moreover, Kuehn's participation on
his client's board of directors would raise a presumption that he
participated in its operation or management. Kuehn might claim
that the corporations were mere shells, and at the time of the
lawsuit, they had played no role in the infringing scheme. How-
ever, once Kuehn created the corporations, playing a key role in
defining each corporation's organization and business purpose, he
should be deemed to have participated in the operation or man-
agement of these newly formed corporations.
In Biofeedtrac, then, the three-factor approach suggests that
Reves's test is met, but this is only the first step toward Kuehn's
liability under RICO. It may be that the pattern of racketeering
activity occurred outside of Kuehn's role as director of the corpo-
rations. If the plaintiff defines the RICO enterprise as the opera-
tion of Kolinor, then Kuehn's directorship in an entirely separate
enterprise is irrelevant. However, Reves and the suggested ap-
proach answer only whether there has been participation in the
operation or management of the defined enterprise.
Overall, on the facts of Biofeedtrac, a court should conclude
that Kuehn participated in the operation or management of the
newly formed corporations, but that his conduct before these
corporations were created was not sufficient direction of his
client's affairs to meet the Reves test. Of the three factors, only
the participation on a client's board of directors raises a pre-
sumption that Reves was met. Had Kuehn met either or both of
the first two factors, but not the third, a court would have to
10 Id at 587.
11 The court does not specify what else the two Delaware corporations headed by
Kuehn were to do.
... Id at 588.
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assess, in light of RICO's goals and the context of the attorney-
client relationship, whether he participated in the operation or
management of the illegal enterprise.
CONCLUSION
Courts should abandon the legal services standard in favor of
a more flexible, albeit more complex, test. The variety of legal
services that attorneys provide necessitates a standard that will
catch all forms of attorney participation in operation or manage-
ment. By looking for three specific factors often indicative of de
facto operation or management by an attorney-substantial usur-
pation by the attorney of management's responsibilities, initia-
tion of the legal services by the attorney, and the wielding of
significant persuasive power-courts should be able to distin-
guish attorneys innocently working for the wrong enterprise from
attorneys intimately involved in the operation and management
of a racketeering enterprise.
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